
7 



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Glass 

Book 2J 



/ 
LETTER 



FROM THE 



HON. TIMOTHY PICKERING, 

A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES 



ST A IT. 01 if AS SETTS, 

IIIHITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS 

A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER 

OF AN 

UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR. 

ADDRESSED TO 

HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES 3L'T,-,TVAN , 

GOVERNORS. ILL SAID SI.!:*.' ',' 



BOSTON : 
PRINTED BT CREEXOUGH AND STEBB1XS. 

1 808. 




TO THE READER. 

i 

THE following is a publick Letter. It is very properly addressed 
to the Governor, and through him to the Legislature : by this channel it 
would have come most regularly to the eye of the whole people. It is not 
known to the publishers why it has not been already printed for the use of 
the publick ; — whether it is only delayed, or intended to be entirely with- 
held. But a copy, which was sent from Washington, after the original, to a 
private friend, has been happily obtained for the press. 

If at this day any honest citizen cm doubt of the great credit and 
weight to which the facts and opinions of the Writer arc f u'rly entitled, •-uch 
citizen is referred to the Writer's enemies for information. Among these 
many of the most respectable will say, that his pure patriotism and intrepid 
publick virtue have honoured the name of Republican in our country, and 
would have honoured the best of the Romans, in the best days of Rome. 
Boston, March 9tl>, 1808. 



CITY OF WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 1G, 1808. 



SIR, 



IN the even current of ordinary times, an 
addrefs from a Senator in Congrefs to his conftituents might be 
difpenfed with. In fuch times, the proceedings of the Executive 
and Legiflature of the United States, exhibited in their publlck aBs, 
might be fufficient. But the prefent fingular condition of our 
country, when its mod interefting concerns, wrapt up in myftcry, 
excite univcrfal alarm, requires me to be no longer filcnt. Perhaps 
I am liable to cenfure, at fuch a crifis, for not fooner prefenting, to 
you and them, fuch a view of our national affairs as my official litu- 
ation has placed in my power. I now addrefs it to yon, "Sir, as the 
proper organ of communication to the legiflature. 

The attainment of truth is ever defirable : and I cannot per- 
mit myfelf to doubt that the ftatement I now make muft be accept- 
able to all who have an agency in directing the affairs, and who are 
guardians of the intcrefts of our Commonwealth, which fo materially 
depend on the mcafures of the Government of the Nation. At the 
fame time, I am aware of the jealoufy with which, in thefe unhappy 
days of party diflenfions, my communications may, by fome of my 
conftituents, be received. Of this I will not complain : while I 
eameftly wiih the fame jealoufy to be extended towards all pub- 
lick men. Yet I may claim fome (hare of attention and credit — 
that fhare which is due to the man who defies the world to point, 
in the whole courfe of a long and publick life, at one inftance of 
deception, at a fingle departure from truth. 

The embargo demands the firft notice. For perhaps no aft of 
the National Government has ever produced fo muoh folicitude, or 
fpread fuch univerfal alarm. Becaufe all naturally conclude, that a 



meafure pregnant with incalculable mifchief to all claflcs of our fel- 
low-citizens, would not have been propofed by the Prefident, and 
adopted by Congrefs, but for caufes deeply affecting the interefts 
and fafety of the nation. It mud have been under the influence of 
this opinion that the legiflative bodies of fome States have exprcfT- 
ed their approbation of the Embargo, either explicitly, or by im- 
plication. 

The following were all the papers laid by the Prefident before 
Congrefs, as the grounds of the Embargo. 

1. The proclamation of the King of Great-Britain requiring the 
return of his fubjeds, the feamen efpecially, from foreign countries, 
to aid, in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own. 
But it being an acknowledged principle, that every nation has a 
rirrht to the fervice of its fubjeds in time of war, that proclamation 
could not furnifh the flightcft: ground for an Embargo. 

2. The extract of a letter from the Grand Judge Regnier to 
the French Attorney General for the Council of Prizes. This 
contained a partial interpretation of the imperial blockading decree 
of November 21, 1806. This decree, indeed, and its interpreta- 
tion, prefent flagrant violations of our neutral rights, and of the cx- 
ifling treaty between the United States and France : but Hill, the 
execution of that decree could not (from the fmall number of 
French cruifers) extenfively interrupt our trade. Thcfe two pa- 
pers were publick. 

P>. The letter from our Minifter, Mr. Armflroog, to Mr. Cham- 
pagny, the French Minifter of Foreign Aflairs : and 

4. Mr. Champagny's anfwer. Both thefe ought, in form or 
fubftance, alfo to have been made publick. The latter would have 
furnifhed to our nation fome idea of the views and expectations of 
France. But both were withdrawn by the Prefident, to be depof- 
ited among other Executive fecrets : while neither prefented any 
new ground to juflify an Embargo. 



In the vSenate, thefe papers were referred to a committee. The 
committee quickly reported a bill for laying an Embargo, agreea- 
bly to the Prefider.t's propofal. This was read a firft, a fecond, 
and a third time, and palled ; and all in the fliort compafs of about 
four hours ! A little time was repeatedly aiked, to obtain further 
information, and to confider a meafure of fuch moment, of fuch 
univerfal concern : but thefe requefts were denied. We were hur- 
ried into the paiTage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being 
rejected, if we were allowed time to obtain further information, 
and deliberately confider the fubjeft. For to that time our veflels 
were freely failing on foreign voyages ; and in a national point of 
view, the departure of half a dozen or a dozen more, while we were 
inquiring into the necefiity or expediency of the Embargo, was of 
little moment. Or if the danger to our veflels, feamen and mer- 
chandize had been fo extreme as r.ot to admit of one day's delay, 
ought not that extreme danger to have been exhibited to Congrefs ? 
The Conflitution which requires the Prefident " to give to Congrefs 
information of the date of the union," certainly meant, not partial, 
but complete information on the fubjedl of a communication, fo far 
as he pofleflcd it. And when it enjoins him " to recommend to 
their confideration fuch meafurcs as he fliould judge neceflary and 
expedient," it as certainly intended that thofe recommendations 
fhould be bottomed on information communicated, not on fails ivith- 
heldi and locked up in the Executive cabine* Had the publick 
fafety been at (lake, or any great publick good been prefented to 
our view, but which would be loft by a moment's delay ; there 
would have been fome apology for difpatch, though none for adling 
without due information. In truth, the meafure appeared to me 
then, as it ftill does, and as it appears to the publick, without a 
fufficient motive, without a legitimate object. Hence the general 
inquiry — " For what is the Embargo laid ?" And I challenge 1 
any man not in the fecrets of the Executive to tell. I know, Sir, 
that the Prefident faid the papers abovementioned " fhowed that 
great and increafing dangers threatened our veflels, our feamen, and 
our merchandize :" but I alfo know that they exhibited no new 
dangers ; none of which our merchants and feamen had not been 
well apprized. The Britilh proclamation had many days before 



been publifhed in the newfpapers [the copy laid before lis by the 
Prefident had been cut out of a nevvfpaper ;] and fo had the fub- 
ftance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excit- 
ed little concern among merchants and feamen, the prefervation of 
whofe perfons and property was the profejfed object of the Prefi- 
dent's recommendation of an Embargo. The merchants and fea- 
men could accurately eftimate the dangers of continuing their com- 
mercial operations ; of which dangers, indeed, the a&ual premiums 
of infurance were a fatisfactory gauge. Thofe premiums had very 
little increafed : by the Britifh proclamation not a cent : and by 
the French decree fo little as not to ftop commercial enterprizes. 
The great numbers of vefTels loading or loaded, and prepared for 
fca ; the exertions every where made, on the firft rumour of the 
Embargo, to difpatch them ; demon (Irate the Prefident's dangers 
to be imaginary — to have been ajfumed. Or if great and real dan- 
gers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, orfure to fall, 
how defirable was it to have had them officially declared and publish- 
ed ! This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and prevent- 
ed every complaint. Befides, the dangers clearly defined and un- 
derftood, the publick mind would not have been difquieted with im- 
aginary fears, the more tormenting, becaufe uncertain. 

It is true that confiderable numbers of vefTels were collected in 
our ports, and many held in fufpenfe : not, however, from any new 
dangers which appeared; but from the myfterious conduct of our 
affairs, after the attack on the Chefapcake ; and from the painful 
npprehenfion that the courfe the Prefident was purfuing would ter- 
minate in war. The National Intelligencer (ufually confidered 
as the Executive newfpaper) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed 
through the United States. War, probable or inevitable war, was 
the conftant theme of the newfpapers, and of the converfations, as 
was reported, of perfons fuppofed to be bed informed of Executive 
defigns. Yet amid this din of war, no adequate preparations were 
feen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thoufand 
militia to fight the Britifh navy (for there was no appearance of an 
enemy in any other fliape) was fo completely abfurd, as to excite, 
with men of common fenfe, no other emotion than ridicule. Not 



the fhadow of a reafon that could operate on the mind of a man of 
common underftanding can be offered in its juftilication. # The re- 
fufal of the Britifh officer to receive the frigate Chefapeake as a 
prize, when tendered by her commander, is a demonftration that the 
attack upon her was exclusively for the purpofe of taking their 
deferters ; and not intended as the commencement of a ivar be- 
tween the two nations. The Prefident knew that the Britifh had 
no invading army to land on our fhores ; and the detached militia 
would be ufelefs, except againfl land-forces. Why then was this 
order for the Militia given ? — The nature of the cafe, and the actu- 
al flate of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if not 
its only object, was to increafe the publick alarm, to aggravate the 
publick refentment againfl; Great-Britain, to excite a war pulfe ; 
and in the height of this artificial fever of the publick mind, which 
was to be made known in Great-Britain, to renew the demands on 
her government ; in the poor expectation of extorting, in that flate 
of things, conceffions of points which fhe had always confidered as 
her rights, and which at all times and under all circumftances, fhe 
had uniformly refufed to relinquifh. The refult of the fubfequent 
negociation at London has fhown how utterly unfounded was the 
Prefident's expectation, how perfectly ufelefs all this blufter of war. 
While no well informed man doubted that the Britifh Government 
would make fuitable reparation for the attack on the Chefapeake. 
The Prefident himfelf, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on 
that footing. A rupture between the two nations, faid he, " is e- 
qually oppofed to the interefts of both, as it is to afTurances of the 
moft friendly difpofitions on the part of the Britifh Government, 
in the midft of which this outrage was committed. In this light 
the fubject cannot but prefent itfelf to that Government, and 
ftrengthen the motives to an honourable reparation for the wrong 
which has been done." And it is now well known that fuch rep- 
aration might have been promptly obtained in London, had the 
Prefident's inftructions to Mr. Monroe been compatible with fuch 
an adjuftment. He was required not to negociate on this fingle, 
tranfient act (which when once adjufled was for ever fettled) but 
in connection with another claim of long Handing, and, to fay the 
leaft, of doubtful right ; to wit, the exemption from impreffment 



of BrU'ifh feamen found on board American merchant veflcls. To 
remedy the evil ariiing from its exercife, by which our own citizens 
were fometimes impreffed, the attention of our Government, under 
every adminiftration, had been earneftly engaged : but no practica- 
ble plan has yet been contrived : while no man who regards the 
truth, will queftion the difpofition of the Britifli Government to a- 
dopt any arrangement that will fecure to Great-Britain the fervices 
of her own fubjecls. And now, when the unexampled fituation of 
that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with France and 
her numerous dependent States — left alone to withftand the 
Power which menaces the liberties of the world) rendered the aid 
of all her fubjects more than ever needful ; there was no reafonable 
ground to expeft that fhe would yield the right to take them when 
found on board the merchant vefiels of any nation. Thus to infill 
on her yielding this point, and infeparably to connect it with the 
affair of the Chefapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to 
uegociate at all. 

I write, Sir, with freedom ; for the times are too perilous to al- 
low thofe who are placed in high and refponfible fituations to be 
fdent or referved. The peace and fafety of our country are fuf- 
pended on a thread. The courfe we have feen purfued leads on to 
war— to a war with Great-Britain — a war abfolutely without ne- 
ceflity — a war which whether difaflrous or fuccefsful, mud bring 
mifery and ruin to the United States : rmfery by the deftruction of 
our navigation and commerce (perhaps alfo of our faireft fea- 
port towns and cities) the lofs of markets for our produce, the 
want of foreign goods and manufactures, and the other evils inci- 
dent to a ftate of war : and ruin, by the lofs of our liberty and in- 
dependence. For if with the aid of our arms Great-Britain were 
fubdued, — from that moment (though flattered perhaps with the 
name of allies) we fliould become the Provinces of France. This is 
a refult fo obvious, that I muft crave your pardon for noticing it. 
Some advocates of Executive meafures admit it. They acknowl- 
edge that the navy of Britain is our fhield againft. the overwhelm- 
ing power of France. — Why then do they perfift in a courfe of 
conduft tending to a rupture with Great-Britain ? — Will it be 



eved that it is principally, or folely, to procure inviolability to 
merchant flag of the United States ? In other words, to pro- 

aU feamen, Britijh fubjeds, as well as our own citizens, on 
rd our merchant veffels ? It is a fact that this has been made 
greateft obftacle to an amicable fettlement with Great- Britain. 

(I repeat) it is perfectly well known that (he defires to obtain 

her own fubjebls ; and that American citizens, impreffed by 
ake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil 
:omplain of arifes from the impoffibility of always diftinguifhing 
perfons of two nations who a few years fince were one peo- 

who exhibit the fame manners, fpeak the fame language, and 
efs fimilar features. But feeing that we feldom hear complaints 
he great navigating States, how happens there to be fuch ex- 
le fympathy for American feamen at Wafl/ington ? Efpecially 
;entlemen from the interiour States, which have no feamen, or 
i thofe Atlantick States whofe native feamen bear a very fmall 
aortion to thofe of New-England ? In fad, the caufes of com- 
nt are much fewer than are pretended. They rarely occur in 
States whofe feamen are chiefly natives. The firft merchant in 
United States, in anfwcring my late inquiry about Britifh im- 
fments, fays, " Since the Chefapeake affair we have had no 
e of complaint. I cannot find one fingle inftance where they 
: taken one man out of a merchant veffel. I have had more 
1 twenty veffels arrived in that time, without one inftance of a 

being taken by them. Three Swedes were taken out by a 
nch frigate. I have made inquiry of all the matters that have 
red in this vicinity, and cannot find any complaints againft the 
ifh confers."' 

!an gentlemen of known hojlility to foreign commerce in our own 
■Is — who are even willing to annihilate it (and fuch there are) — - 
thefe gentlemen plead the caufe of our^amf « becaufe. they real- 
rifh to protect them ? Can thofe defne to prated our feamen, who, 
laying an imneceffary embargo, expofe them by thoufands to 
ve or beg P — One gentleman has faid (and I believe he does not 
i alone) that fooner than admit the principle that Great- Brit- 
:iad a right to take her onvnfubjefts from our merchant veflels, he 



10 

would abandon commerce altogether ! — To what will every nun in 
New-England and of the other navigating States, afcribc fuch a fen- 
timent ? A fcntimeiit which] to prevent the temporary lofs of five 
men, by imprefs, would reduce fifty thoufand to beggary ? But for 
the Embargo, thoufands depending on the ordinary operations of 
commerce, would now be employed. Even under the reilraints of 
the orders of the Br'tiih Government, retaliating the French im- 
perial decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the 
commerce of the United States. We may yet purfue our trade 
with the Britifh dominions, in every part of the globe ; with Afri- 
ca, with China, and with the colonies of France, Spain, and Hol- 
land. And let me aik, whether in the nrdlt of a profound peace, 
when the powers of Europe poflefling colonies, would, as formerly, 
confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit u 
foreigners, only under great limitations, we could enjoy a commerce 
much more extculivc than is practicable at this moment, if the I m« 
bargo were not in the way ? . Why then Ihould it be continued ? 
Why rather was it ever laid ? Can tl itimate reafona for 

the Embargo which are concealed from Congrefs, at the moment 
when they are required to impofe it : Are the reafons to be found 
in the difpatches from Talis : Thefe have been moved for ; and 
the motion was qualhed by the advocates for the Embargo. Why 
are thefe difpatches withheld by the Executive ? Why, when all 
claffes of citizens anxioufly inquire " For what is the Embargo 
laid :" is a falisfactory anluer denied ? Why is not Congrefi made 
acquainted with the actual lituation of the United States in relation 
to France ? Why, in this dangerous crilis, are Mr. Arrnftroi 
letters to the Secretary of State abfoluetly withheld, fo that a line 
of them cannot be feen ? Did they contain no information of the 
demands and intentions of the French Emperor ? Did the Revenue 
fail from England to France, and there wait three or four weeks for 
difpatches of no importance ? IT fo, why, regardlefs of the publick 
Solicitude, are their contents fo carefully concealed ? If really un- 
important, what harm can ariie from telling Congrefs and the Na- 
tion, officially, that they contain nothing of moment to the fafety, 
the liberty, the honour, or the interc-ils of the United States ? On 
the contrary, are they fo clofely locked up becaufe they will not 



11 

bear the light ? Would their difclofure roufe the fpirit of the peo- 
ple, ftill (lumbering in blind confidence in the Executive ? Has the 
French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals ? Has he 
required that our ports, like thofe of his vaffal ftates in Europe, be 
Jbut againjl Britjjlo commerce P Is the Embargo a fubjlltute, a milder 
form of compliance with that harfli demand, which if exhibited in 
its naked and infulting afpect, the American fpirit might yet re- 
fent ? Are we ftill to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declara- 
tions and avowed defigns of the French Emperor, although thefe 
may ftrike at our liberty and independence ? And, in the mean 
time, are we, by a thoufand irritations, by cherifning prejudices, and 
by exciting fre(h refentments, to be drawn gradually into a war 
with Great-Britain ? Why amidft the extreme anxiety of the pub- 
lick mind, is it ftill kept on the rack of fearful expectation, by the 
Prefident's portentous fdence respecting his French difpatches ? — 
In this concealment there is danger. In this concealment mull be 
wrapt up the real caufe of the Embargo. On any other fuppofi- 
tion it is inexplicable. 

I am alarmed, Sir, at this perilous flate of things, I cannot re- 
prefs my fufpicions ; or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds 
on which they reft. The people are advifed to repofe implicit 
confidence in the National Government : in that unbounded confi- 
dence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence, the Execu- 
tive may procure the adoption of meafures which may overwhelm 
us with ruin, as furely as if he had an army at his heels. By falfe 
policy, or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and 
fubjugated to France, as furely as by corruption. I tru ft, Sir, that 
no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I fay, that I 
have fome knowledge of publick men and of publick affairs : and 
on that knowledge, and with folemnity, I declare to you, that I 
have no confidence in the wifdom or corre&nefs of our publick meaf- 
ures : that our country is in imminent danger : that it is effential ° 
to the publick fafety that the blind confidence in our Pviilers ftiould 
ceafe ; that the State Legiflatures ftiould know the facts and rea- 
fons on which important general laws are founded ; and efpecially 
that thofe Stales whofe farms are on the ocean, and wbojk harvejls are 



12 

gathered in every fea,Jhould immediately and fertoujly conjider hoiv to 
preferve them. In all the branches of Government, commercial in- 
formation is wanting ; and in " this defert," called a city, that 
want cannot be fupplied. Nothing but the fenfe of the commer- 
cial States, clearly and emphatically exprefTed, will fave them from 
ruin. 

Are our thoufands of (hips and vefTels to rot in our harbours ? 
Are our fixty thoufand feamen and fifhermen to be deprived of em- 
ployment, and, with their families, reduced to want and beggary ? 
Are our hundreds of thoufands of farmers to be compelled to fuffer 
their millions in furplus produce to perifh on their hands ; that the 
Prefident may make an experiment on our patience and fortitude, 
and on the towering pride, the boundlefs ambition, and unyielding 
perfeverance of the Conqueror of Europe ? Sir, I have reafon to»be- 
lieve that the Prefident contemplates the continuance of the Embar- 
go until the French Emperor repeals his decrees violating as well 
his treaty with the United States as every neutral right ; and un- 
til Britain thereupon recals her retaliating orders ! — By that time 
we may have neither fhips nor fcamen : and that is precifely the 
point to which fome men wifli to reduce us. — To fee the improvi- 
dence of this projeft (to call it by no harfher name, and without ad- 
verting to ulterior views) let us lookback to former years. 

Notwithftanding the well-founded complaints of fome individuals, 
and the murmurs of others ; notwithftanding the frequent Execu- 
tive declarations of maritime aggreflions committed by Great-Brit- 
ain ; notwithftanding the outrageous decrees of France and Spain, 
and the wanton fpoliations practifed and executed by their cruifers 
and tribunals, of which we fometimes hear a faint whifper ; — the 
commerce of the United States has hitherto profpered beyond all 
example. Our citizens have accumulated wealth ; and the publick 
'icvenue, annually increafing, has been the Prefident's annual boast. 

Thefe fafts demonftrate, that although Great-Britain, with her 
thoufand mips of war, could have deftroyed our commerce, {he 
has really done it. no efTential injury ; and that the other belligerents 



IS 

heretofore reftrained by fome regard to National Law, and limit- 
ed by the (mall number of their cruifers, have not inflicted upon it 
any deep wound. Yet in this full tide of fuccefs, our commerce is 
fuddenly arrefled : an alarm of war is raifed : fearful apprehenfions 
are excited : the merchants, in particular, thrown into a ftate of 
confternation, are advifed, by a voluntary embargo, to keep theif 
veifels at home. And what is the caufe of this mighty but mif- 
chievous akrm ? We know it in its whole extent. It ivas the un- 
authorized attack of a Briti/h naval officer on the American frigate 
Chefnpeake, to fearch for and take fome deferters hnoivn to have been 
received on board, ivho had been often demanded, and as often refufedto 
be delivered up. As was expected by all confiderate men, and by 
the Prefident himfelf (as I have before obferved) the Britifh Gov- 
ernment, on the firft information of the unfortunate event (and with- 
out waiting for an application) difavowed the act of its officer — dif- 
claimed the principle of fearching National armed veffels — and de- 
clared its readinefs to make fuitable reparation, as foon as the ftate 
of the cafe fhould be fully known. 

Under fuch circumftances, who can juliify this alarm of war ? An 
alarm which greatly difquieted the publick mind, and occafioned 
an interruption of commerce extremely injui'ious to our merchants 
and fea-faring citizens. 

I will clofe this long letter by ftating all the exifling pretences — 
for there are no caufes — for a war with Great-Britain. 

1. The Britifh (hips of war, agreeably to a right claimed and ex- 
ercifed for ages — a right claimed and exercifed during the whole of 
the adminiftrations of Wafhington, of Adams, and of Jefferfon, — 
continue to take fome of the Britifh feamen found on board ouf 
merchant veffels, and with them a fmall number of ours, from the 
impoffibility of always diftinguifhing Englifhmen from citizens of 
the United. States. On this point our Government well know 
that Great-Britain is perfectly willing to adopt any arrangement 
that can be devifed, which will fecure to her fervice the feamen <who 
are her own fubjeSs ; and at the fame time exempt ours from imprefl- 
ment. 



14 

1. The merchant veiTels of France, Spain and Holland, being 
driven from the ocean, or deftroyed, the commerce of thofe countries 
with one another, and with their colonies, could no longer be carri- 
ed on by themfelves. Here the velTels of neutral nations came in 
to their aid, and carried on nearly the whole commerce of thofe na- 
tions. With their feamen thus liberated from the merchant fer- 
vice, thofe nations, in the prefent and preceding wars, were enabled 
to man their (hips of war ; and the neutral veiTels and feamen fup- 
plying their places, became in faS, though not in name, auxiliaries 
in ivar. The commerce of thofe nations, without one armed fhip 
on the fea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be 
fecured under neutral flags ; while the merchant veiTels of Great- 
Britain, with its numerous armed fhips to guard them, were expof- 
ed to occafional captures. — Such a courfe of things Great-Britain 
has refilled, not in the prefent only, but in former wars ; at lead 
as far back as that of 1756. And (he has claimed and main- 
tained a right to impofe on this commerce fome limits and re- 
ftraints ; becaufe it was a commerce which was denied by thofe na- 
tions to neutrals in times of peace ; becaufe it was a commerce of 
immenfe value to the fubjedls of her enemies ; and becaufe it filled 
their treafuries with money to enable them to carry on their wars 
with Great-Britain. 

3. The third and only remaining pretence for war with Great- 
Britain, is the unfortunate affair of the Chefapeake ; which having 
been already. ftated and explained, I will only remark here, that it is 
not to be believed that the Britifh Government, after being defeated, 
as before mentioned, in its endeavours to make reparation in Lon- 
don, for the wrong done by its fervant, would have fent hither a 
fpecial envoy to give honourable fatisfacTion , but from its fincere de- 
fire to clofe this wound, if our own Government would fujfer it to bt 
healed. 

Permit me now to afk, what man, impartially viewing the fub- 
je&, will have the boldnefs to fay that there exifls any caufe for 
plunging the United States into a war with Great-Britain ? Who 
that refpecTs his reputation as a man of common difcernment will 



15 

fay it ? Who that regards the interefts and welfare of his country- 
will fay it ? Who then can juftify, who can find an excufe for a 
courfe of conduct which has brought our country into its prefent 
ftate of alarm, embarrafTment and diflrefs ? For myfelf, Sir, I mull 
declare the opinion, that no free country was ever before fo caufe- 
lefsly, and fo blindly, thrown from the height of profperity, and 
plunged into a ftate of dreadful anxiety and fuffering. But from 
this degraded and wretched fituation it is not yet too late to efcape. 
Let the difpatches from our Minifter in France be no longer con- 
cealed. Let the Prefident perform the duty required of him by 
the Conftitution ; by giving to Congrefs full information ofthejlaie 
of the union in refpect to foreign nations. Above all, let him unfold 
our ailual fituation with France. Let him tell us what are the de- 
mands and propofals of her Ruler. Had thefe been honourable to 
/the United States, would not the Prefident have been eager to dif- 
clofe them ? that they are of an entirely different nature, that they 
are difijonourable, that they are ruinous to our commercial interejls, and 
dangerous to our liberty and independence, we are left to infer. 

I hope Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the fubjecr. will 
furnifh a fufficient apology for the length and ftyle of this letter. 
Perhaps fome may deem it prefumptuous thus to queftion the cor- 
redtnefs of the proceedings of our Government. A ftrong fenfe of 
duty, and diftreffing apprehenfions of National ruin, have forced the 
talk upon me. To fome the fentiments which, in the fincerity of 
my heart, I have expreffed, may give offence : for often nothing 
offends fo much as truth. Yet I do not defire to offend any man. 
But when I fee the dangerous extent of Executive influence : when 
I fee the Great Council of the Nation called on to enaft laws deep- 
ly affecting the interefts of all claffes of citizens, without adequate 
information of the reafons of that call : when I obferve the decep- 
tive gloffes with which the mifchicfs of the Embargo are attempt- 
ed to be palliated ; and pojlerior events adduced as reafons to juftify 
the meafure : when I know that the rifles of continuing their com- 
mercial purfuits againft all known dangers can and will be more ac- 
curately calculated by our merchants than by our Government : 
when if any new dangers to commerce were impending, of which 



iu' 

our merchants were uninformed, but of which the Government ob- 
tained the knowledge through its Minifter at Paris, or elf: where, 
it was plainly the duty of the Executive to make thole dan 
known to Congrefs and T he Nation : and fince if fo made known, 
the merchants and fca-faring citizens would, for their own inteteilj 
and fafety, have taken due precautions to guard againfl them : and 
as it hence appears certain that an Embargo was not nccefiary to 
the fafety of "our feamen, our vefTels, or our merchandize :' — 
when, Sir, I fee and confidcr thefe things, and their evil tendency : 
in a word, when I obferve a courie of proceeding which to me ap- 
pears calculated to miflcad the publick mind to publick ruin ; I can- 
not be filent. Regardlefs, therefore, of perional conicquena , I 
have undertaken to communicate thefe details ; with the view to 
diflipate dangerous illufions ; to give to my Conflituents corrctt in- 
formation ; to excite inquiry ; and to route that vigilant |caloufy 
which is characftcriftick of REPUBLICANS, and thVntial to th< 
prcfervaiion of tlieir lights, their libeities, and their independi 1 

1 have the honour to be, 

very jvfpectfully, 

Sir, 

Your obedii nt Servant, 

TIMOTHY PICKERING. 

Hit Excellency .LIMES Si' L 1.1 TAN, 

Governor of the Commonwealth of Majfachufcits. 



